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EXTERNAL DEBT, CAPITAL FLIGHT AND POLITICAL RISK
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation of the simultaneous occurrence of
large accumulation of external debt, private capital outflow and relatively
low domestic capital formation in developing countries. We consider a general
equilibrium modelin wflich two types of government with conflicting
distributional goals randomly alternate in office. Uncertainty over the
fiscal policies of future governments generates private capital flight and
small domestic investment.This political uncertainty also provides the
incentives for the current government to over accumulate external debt. The
model also predicts that left wing governments are more inclined to impose
restrictions on capital outflows than right wing governments. Finally, we
examine how political uncertainty affects the risk premium charged by lenders
and how debt repudiation may occur after a change of political regime.
Alberto Alesina Guido Tabellini
CSIA Department of Economics
Carnegie Mellon University University of California
Pittsburgh, PA 15213 405 Hilgard Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 900241. Introduction
Inthe seventies and eighties, while the public sectors of many
developing countries were accumulating largeexternal debts, the private
sectors of those same countries were accumulating large external assets.1 The
extent of this phenomenon is documented in Table 1.It is most evident in
Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Uruguay, and to a lesser extent in Peru and the
Philippines. Massive capital outflows also occurred in Peru and Chile in the
early 1970s, which are not included in Table 1 (see Ascher (1986)). In
addition, Dornbusch (1986) emphasizes that large accumulation of imported
durable consumption goods in Chile in 1979—82 had the same effects of capital
fligflt.2 Domestic investment in productive capital in all of these countries
has generally declined, particularly from the late seventies onward.3
Because of the adverse terms of trade shocks of the late 1970s and early
1980s, this peculiar intermediation by the U.S. banks has contributed to
expose the Latin American public sectors to very high real interest rates
(evaluated in domestic currencies). Moreover, since the private external
assets are generally not being repatriated, the Latin American economies had
to undergo tremendous adjustments to generate the foreign exchange needed to
service their debt, as Diaz Alejandro (1984), Dornbusch (1986) and Edwards
(1987) pointed out.
This paper seeks toexplain this apparent form of collective
irrationality as the result of politicalpolarization and political
instability.It also suggests why several governments did not attempt to
prevent these capital flights, by imposing restrictions on capital outflows,
by avoiding sharp appreciations of their exchange rates and by restricting
their own public external borrowing.This behavior is explained as the
rational response of policyniakers who maximize the welfare of their own
constituency or social group as opposed to collective welfare, in economies
politically and socially polarized.4
We consider an economy with two groups of agents identified by their
productive role: the "workers (wage earners) and the "capitalists" (owners
of physical capital and profit earners). The two groups have their own
political representatives ("parties") that alternate in office. Although this
is a highly stylized characterization of the political arena, it certainly
captures some important aspects of the politico—economic structure ofT
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.
 developing countries. Each government implements policies that are beneficial
for its own group. We consider in particular fiscal policies, even though in
a more general setting additional policy instruments could be considered, such
as monetary and exchange rate policies.
The purpose of the fiscal policy of the party in office is to
redistribute income in favor of its own constituency. Thus, if these policies
are sucessful, one should observe that the distribution of income is
correlated to the political orientation of the government. Tables 2 and 3,
which are based upon different statistical sources, show that this may in fact
be the case at least in four countries, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay.
These countries have been selected from the larger sample of Table 1 because
they have experienced the more clearly identifiable changes of regimes in the
period in which reliable data are available. Both tables show that left wing
governments have generally increased the labor share of national income, and
reduced the operating surplus; the opposite holds for right wing regimes.
Table 4 reports an indirect piece of evidence along the same line. It shows
that minimum wages have been much higher (lower) during left wing (right wing)
regimes.
Broadly speaking, these tables suggest that ideological polarization has
been associated with polarization of redistributive policies. Thus, political
uncertainty about the nature of future governments generates economic
uncertainty about future economic policies. Private capital flight is
explained in this paper as an insurance against the risk of future taxation,
as in Khan—Haque (1986), Eaton (1987), Eaton—Gersovitz (1987) and Giovannini
(1988). We then show that the desirability of capital controls depends on the
political nature of the government: the government representing the capitalist
constituency never finds it optimal to impose capital controls; conversely,
the government representing the interests of the worker always imposes some
restrictions on capital outflows, even if they are binding on capitalists as
well as on workers.
Political uncertainty also explains the accumulation of external debt
above the social planner's optimum. Overborrowing occurs if the current
government does not fully internalize the future costs of servicing the
debt.Consider, for instance, the case in which both governments tax their
opponents at the maximum feasible level in order to redistribute to their own
constituency. The government which currently borrows, say the 'capitalist"
2TABLE 2
Income Distribution and Political Regimes
Source: United Nations
Ratio of Ratio of
Compensation of Operating Surplus
Employees Over Over GOP
GDP (averages) (averages)
Argentina
1970—72 Right .44 .44
1973—75 Left .44 .47
1976—83 Right .31 .57
Chile
1971—73 Left .45 .37
1974—84 Right .39 .36
Peru
1970—76 Left .37 .50
1977—84 Right .32 .53
Uruguay
1970—72 Left .43 .39
1973—76 Right .40 .43
1977—81 Center/Right .32 .49
Source:United Nations, National Account Statistics: Main Aggregates. The
classification of political regimes is obtained from Banks (1986).Table 3
Income Distribution and Political Regimes
National Sources
Labor Share Capital Share
(1) (2)
Argentina
1967—72 Right .41 N.A.
1973—75 Left .45 N.A.
Chile
1969—72 Left .56 .39
1974—82 Right .45 .42
Peru
1970—76 Left .43 .58
1977—79 Right .40 .66
Uruguay
1967—72 Left .48 .50 (i)
1973—76 Right .41 (ii) .51 (ii)
1976—84 Center/Right .35 .59
(1) Labor share defined as compensation of employees over national disposable
I ncome.
(2) Capital share defined as operating surplus over national disposable
income.
(i) 1970 only
(ii) Average 1975—76
Sources: Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 21, Chapter 14, Table
1404; Banco Central de Chile, Boletin Mensuel (various issues); Instituto
National de la Pianification: "Cuentos Nacionales del Peru' July 1980 (Table 8
p. 82); Central Bank of Uruguay, Suninary of National Statistics.Table 4
Index of Minimum Real Wage (non—agricultural)
and Political Regimes (1970 100)
Averages
Right Left Right
1967—72 1973—75 1976-80
Argentina 92.2 116.7 51.2
Left Right
1967—73 1973—80
Chile 92.6 72.1
Right Left Right
1967-68 1969-76 1977-80
90.5 97.9 92.4
Left Right
1967-72 1973—80
Uruguay 100.2 65.5
Source: Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 24, Ch. 14, Table 1407.one, knows that with some probability the debt will be serviced in the future
by the workers government, by reducing transfers to the workers. Since these
costs are not internalized, the capitalist government overborrows. The
capitalists use their increased disposable income to consume and optimally
allocate their savings between external assets and domestic investment. Thus,
political polarization leads at the same time to overaccumulation of public
debt and private capital flight.6
These results hold even if each government has the option of repudiating
the debt inherited by its predecessor. Following Cohen—Sachs (1985) and Sachs
(1985) we model reputation costs as a loss to the country's output.7 In
addition we consider the possibility that the external assets held by the
citizen of the defaulting government may be seized. These repudiation costs
have redistributional implications and they are perceived differently by the
two types of government. As a result, repudiation can be observed in
equilibrium if the government which suffers less from repudiating the debt
unexpectedly gains access to office and If the outstanding external debt is
high enough. In particular, if one of the costs of defaulting is the seizure
of private external asset held abroad, then it is less costly for left wing
governments to repudiate; under this assumption one prediction of the model is
that one is more likely to observe debt repudiation if a left wing government
unexpectedly gains orfice.This result is consistent with the empirical
observation that left-wing governments have been more outspoken in criticizing
IMF adjustment plans which attempt to guarantee the solvency of debtor
countries.8Note that, since the interest rate demanded by the lenders
correctly takes this political risk into account, this paper establishes a
precise link between the cost of external borrowing, the risk of debt
repudiation and political risk.
The explanation for private capital outflows given in this paper is meant
to be a complement (rather than an alternative) to the explanation based upon
the risk of expected devaluation of the exchange rate as in Dornbusch (1985)
and Cuddington (1985).We also do not exclude that "policy mistakes" and
"mismanagement1, in addition to political instability, may contribute to
explain excessive government borrowing and private capital flight as
emphasized for instance by, Sachs (1985), Oornbusch (1986, 1987) and Dornbusch
-dePablo (1987).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
6Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium, shows the coexistence of public
borrowing and private capital flights and establishes several results of
comparative statics. Section 4 discusses capital controls. Section 5 extends
the model by considering endogenous default risk.The main esults of the
paper are summarized in the conclusions.
2. The Model
We consider a small open economy producing one good with two groups of
agents, the 'workers and the 'capitalists'. The workers supply inelastically
one unit of labor in each period of their life and are prevented from
acquiring shares of capital: they cannot become capitalists. The assumption
about labor supply can be easily generalized: since the qualitative features
of our results remains unaffected we present the simpler case.9 The
"capitalists' own the capital stock and hire labor. The production technology
of each capitalist is given by a production function:
VtF(Kt,Lt) (1)
where: Vt a output in period t; Kt a capital stock at the beginning of period
t; Lt a employment In period t. F(.) is homogeneous of degree 1. We set Lt4,
so that (1) can be rewritten as:
yt =f(kt) (2)
Letting wt denote the wage we obtain:
wt =f(kt)
—f'(kt)kt (3)
where lower case letters denote units per worker. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the stock of capital does not depreciate, and k1, the stock of
capital at the beginning of period 1, Is exogenously given. The economy lasts
two periods.The qualitative results of this paper can be generalized (at
least for some specification of the utility functions) to the infinite horizon
case, by using the same dynamic progranmiing solution described in Alesina -
Tabellinl(1987).
7The "representative worker" maximizes his expected utility function:
E[u(c1) +Bu(c2fl (4)
subject to the following budget constraints:
c1 ￿w1(1-.r1) +g+eW..,J.bW (5)
c2 w2(1-i2) +g
+b (6)
where: c =worker'sconsumption in period i;￿0,taxes on labor income
in period i; g ￿0government transfers to the worker in period i; b =
externalassets (tax exempt) held by the worker at the beginning of period 2;
ew =taxexempt non—storable endowment available to the worker at the
beginning of period 1; r =worldreal interest rate.The function u(-)
satisfies the usual properties, u'(.) >0and u'(.) <0,plus the Inada
conditions.We also assume that the rate of time preference is identical to
the interest rate, r, so that:
(7)
This assumption Is adopted purely for simplicity, to eliminate any additional
incentive to borrow or lend other than those which are the focus of the
present paper. In particular, this assumption implies that a 'social planner"
would not borrow abroad to redistribute domestic consumption over time.
The "representative capitalist" maximizes his expected utility function:
E[v(x1) +8v(x2)1 (8)
Using (7) the budget contraints can be written as:
x1 ￿(f(k1)
+k1-w1)(1-z1)
-
k2
-3b
+ec+g (9)
<b+(f(k2)+
k2
—
w2)(1—z2)+g (10)
where: x =capitalistconsumption in period I; z1 =taxeson capital and
8capital income; b? =externalassets (tax exempt) of the capitalist at the
beginning of period i; g 0 government transfers to the capitalist; ec =
taxexempt nonstorable endowment available at the beginning of period
The function v(.) satisfies the usual properties, v'(.) >0and v(.)< 0,
and the Inada conditions.
With no loss of generality we assume that at the beginning of period 1
both workers and capitalists do not have assets or liabilities abroad, i.e.,
b=b=0. However, both workers and capitalists have a positive tax exempt
endowment. This makes the first period problem more interesting: both
capitalists and workers have some income which cannot be expropriated and
allows them to make investment/consumption decisions.Finally, the case in
which workers have no access to international capital markets can be easily
addressed as a special case of this model.1'
The government can raise taxes, borrow abroad and make lump sum transfers
to its citizens, while lump sum taxes are unavailable.With no loss of
generality we assume that there are no public goods to be supplied. We also
assume, for simplicity, that the government does not issue domestic bonds. In
Section 3 we argue that our results generalize to the case in which the
government could choose to borrow domestically.Thus given (7) the budget
constraints of the government are:
g +g+
r1W1+z1(k1+f(k1)-w1) +d2 (11)
g +g￿
T2w2+z2(k2+f(k2)-.w2) —d2 (12)
where d2 =externaldebt issued by the government in period 1.
Throughout the paper we assume that the government cannot borrow more
than a certain amount, d:
d2 (13)
For the moment, the credit limit d is assumed to be exogenous and identical
for the two governments.In Section 6 it is endogenously derived when we
explicitly consider the possibility of repudiation:Until then we assume no
repudiation.
The government can be of two types: type 'w', that maximizes the workers'
9welfare (equation (4)); and type 'c', that maximizes the capitalists welfare
(equation (10)).Irrespective of which government is in office in period 1,
type c is in office in period 2 with probability P and type w with probability
i—p.p is exogenously given throughout this paper.If the country is a
democracy, we can interpret this assumption as follows. There are elections
at the end of period 1 and the (rational) voters vote for the party which is
expected to deliver the highest utility for themselves in period 2. The
distribution of preferences of voters and/or the number of abstentions
determines the probabilistic result.Alesina (1988a) and Alesina-Tabellini
(1987) show in a related context how to endogenously derive P from the
underlying preferences of voters. If the country considered is not a
democracy, P represents the likelihood that, say, type "w" government is
overthrown by type "c" government. The likelihood of overthrowing a non
democratic government may be affected by current and expected economic
outcomes; however this link is not considered in this paper.
3. PublIc External Debt and Private Capital Flights
First we characterize the behavior of workers and capitalists by solving
their optimization problems and taking the government actions as given. In
order to simplify the solution we establish the following result.
If: Min[w, f(k2) +k2
—
w21 (14)
then it follows that =g
=0and z1 1if type "w' is in office in
period i, for i =1,2. z =g
=0and =1if type 'c" is in office in
period i, for i =1,2.
Thus, if the workers are in office they expropriate the capitalists and
do not tax labor, and vice versa.In addition, each government does not make
any transfers to its opponents constituency. This result follows from the
fact that each government does not attribute any weight to its opponent
constituency and from the fact that, ex-post, the taxes of this model are non—
distortionary.The labor income tax is non distortionary because the labor
supply is inelastic.The capital income tax is non distortionary ex—post
since, in period 2, k2 is predetermined: this is the well known result that
the optimal tax or capital is time inconsistent, as discussed in more detail
10by Fischer (1980). If the labor supply were elastic, the capitalist government
would not choose =1.The 'c' government would never choose a tax rate in
the negative part of the Laffer curve: they would choose the tax rate which
maximizes tax revenue; In general, this tax rate lies between zero and 1.
Condition (14) implies that each government is always able to repay its
external debt in full without taxing its own group. Otherwise, if in period
2, say, type "c is in office, it sets =1,g =0and z2 equal to the
minimum value necessary to satisfy the government budget constraint.If (14)
holds, this value of z2 is zero. Thus, condition (14) is adopted purely for
notational simplicity:it does not affect the nature of the results in any
respect.
The workers' optimization problem can then be rewritten as follows:
Max u(c1) +e[Pu(b)+(1—P)u(w2+b+g)] (16)
b
subject to (5). The first order condition is:
-u'(c1) +Pu'(b)
+(1—P)u(w2+g+b)
=0 (17)
By the Inada conditions on u(.), (17) implies that, if P <1,then the workers
hold some external assets, b >0.
Using (8) —(10),we can rewrite the capitalists' problem as:
Max v(x1) +[Pv(b
+
k2
+f(k2)
—
w2+g)
+(1—P)(v(b)I (18)
x1, b, k2
subject to (9). The first order conditions are:
—v' (x1) +(1_P)vl(b)+Pv'(b+k2+f(k2)
—+ g)=0 (19a)
—(1.-P)v'(b) +Pv'[b+k2+f(k2)
—
w2+g1[B(1+f'(k2)-11
0 (19b)
According to (19), if P >0,then the capitalists hold external assets
(b >0)and the rate of return on domestic capital exceeds the world real
rate of interesti.e. (8(1+f'(k2)) >1). Thus, political uncertainty
11generates capital flight and reduces domestic capital formation.
Let us now turn to the governments problem.In the last period the
governments optimization problem is very simple. If the type c government is
in office it sets z2 =g
=0and =1.With the tax revenues it services
the debt inherited from the past (if any) and uses the residual to make a
transfer to the capitalists (g >0).The type w government behaves in the
opposite way; T2 =g2
=0,z2 =1,g >0.
Let us now consider the problem faced by the 'c" government in period
1.By using the result just established and by substituting the government's
budget constraint into the objective function, we can rewrite the 'c"
government problem as follows:
max v(y1÷k1÷eC_ab_k2+d2)+s([Pv(y2+k2+f(k2)+b_d2)1+(1_P)[v(b)]} (20)
subject to (13) and the private sector's first order conditions, (17), and
(19).Define as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government
borrowing constraint, (13). Appendix 1 shows that the first order conditions
of this problem imply:
=sv(x1)
—Pv'(f(k2)
+k2
+b_) (21)
Using (19a) and (21) it follows that
=(1-P)v'(b)
(22)
Thus, if P<1 then y>0 and as a result d2d. The government is at a corner
on its external debt: It would like to borrow more but it Is rationed by the
market. Equation (21) provides the intuition for this result. The first term
on the right hand side, 3v(x1), Is the marginal gain of issuing one more
unit of government debt, evaluated in terms of period 1 utility: by issuing
one more unit of external debt, the government obtains an amount of real
resources which can be transferred to the capitalists, yielding a marginal
utility of v'(x1) . Thesecond term on the right hand side of (21),
—BPv'(f(k2) +k2
+b
-), isthe expected marginal disutility of repaying
the debt tomorrow, discounted to the present by a.Specifically, it is the
12marginal disutility of curtailing the transfers to the capitalists, sv'(.),
weighted by the probability P of being in office tomorrow. If thec"
government type is not reappointed tomorrow, then the marginal disutility of
debt is zero, since the capitalists would receive no transfer anyway,
irrespective of the size of the debt. Thus (21) implies that the shadow value
of relaxing the government borrowing constraint, ,isequal to the algebraic
sum of the marginal utility of issuing public debt today and the expected
marginal disutility of repaying it tomorrow.Equation (22) shows that this
sum is always positive if P 1.
We can summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 1:
If 1>P>O, then type c government sets:d2=, z1=g'=O, '-1, g>O
The capitalists and the workers in turn set: x1>O, b>O, k2>O; c1>O, b>O.
The type "c government borrows from abroad as much as it can, in order
to increase current transfers to the capitalists. The latter, in turn,
optimally use these transfers to a) increase consumption, b) acquire foreign
assets sheltered from fiscal expropriation, c) increase domestic investment.
Thus, in equilibrium, the government borrows from abroad while the private
sector acquires foreign assets, despite the fact that they face the same world
interest rate.
Note that Proposition 1 hinges on the fact that the two governments are
always a corner with respect to tax rates and transfers: for instance, if
electedin period 2, the workers government sets z2=1 and chooses g so as to
satisfy the government budget constraint. Thus, any change in external debt
inherited from the past affects the size of transfers but not the level of
taxation, which is always at its maximum.This feature of the equilibrium
follows from the extreme preferences of the two governments: they only care
about one group, and completely disregard the second group. The same result
could also be easily derived from less extreme assumptions about the
goverrrent preferences, as long as the political and administrative costs of
changing taxes are larger than those of changing the size of the transfers.
(See also Alesina-Tabellini (1987) for some discussion of this point in a
related framework).
13If the type w government is in office in period 1 it faces the following
problem:
Max u(k1+ew÷f(k1)fBd2_eb)+a[Pu(b)+(1_P)U(k2÷f(k2)+bd21
(23)
d2,b2,k2,b2
subject to (13) and the private sector's first order conditions, (17), (19)
and (20).Appendix 2 shows that, by the same argument used for the type c
government, the equilibrium Is characterized by:
Proposition 2
If 1>P>0, the the type w government sets: d2=, -r1=g=O, z1=1, g'>0
The workers and the capitalists in turn set: x1>0, b>0, k2>0, c1>O, b>0.
Thus, as in the previous case, the government accumulates as much
external debt as it can, and the private sector insures itself against future
expropriation by holding external assets. The intuition is also the same as
above.
It can be shown (the proof is available upon request) that if the workers
had no access to the international financial market (i.e., if we impose the
constraint b =0),then in equilibrium we would obtain
d￿d2>0
(24)
The reason is that, if b 0, the workers cannot smooth consumption across
time.Thus,their government would not want to tilt their consumption profile
too much: an excessive public borrowing in period 1 could imply a an
excessively low expected consumption in period 2. Thus, the type w government
would not necessarily borrow as much as possible in period 1.
Finally, several comparative static results can be established. By
applying the implicit function theorem to the first order conditions of the
governments' optimization problem, the following results can be proved:
14Proposition 3:
Irrespective of which government is in office in the first period:
ak abW —>o —>o
a ad
ak2 ab ab
-—>o-—>o 0
abC
>0 if type c is in office in period 1
ad
ab—0 if type w is in office in period 1, depending on
ad
parameter values
The proof is in Appendix 3.
Proposition 3 highlights that an increase in the political risk faced by
the capitalists (i.e., a reduction of P,) reduces domestic investment and
leads to more capital flights by the capitalists. However, for the same
reasons, a reduction in P reduces the capital flights of the workers. Under
the realistic assumption that the capital flights of "workers' are much
smaller than those of the capitalists, Proposition 3 implies that capital
flight should be particularly high when right wing regimes are expected to
collapse (and at the beginning of left wing regimes before the new capital
taxation is implemented).
Proposition 3 also implies that relaxing the government borrowing
constraint (i.e., increasing d), leads to more domestic investment but it can
also lead to more capital flight.This implies, for instance, that if the
intervention of international organizations such as the World Bank or the IMF
in the world financial markets enables the government of this developing
country to borrow more, one should observe an increased volume of capital
flight away from this country.
Before closing we argue that the basic results of this section also apply
to a model with domestic government debt. Suppose first that domestic debt is
taxable, like domestic capital. Thus, from the point of view of the public,
15domestic debt is an asset subject to political risk. For this reason, capital
flight would still occur in period 1 as an insurance against risk. In addition
a "risk premium" would be demanded to hold domestic debt. Since the
governments in period 1 are at a corner, in the sense that they would like to
redistribute to their constituency as much as they can, they would still
borrow abroad up to a(atthe risk free interest rate). In addition, they may
go beyond this point and issue some domestic debt. Consider instead the case
in which a certain amount of domestic debt cannot be expropriated and has to
be serviced.Then up to that level, domestic government debt becomes a
perfect substitute of external asset for the public in the first period.
Depending upon the relative magnitude of the "safe" domestic debt relative to
the size of the investment in safe assets desired by the public, private
agents may hold external assets or external liabilities.
4. Capital Controls
Suppose that the private acquisition of foreign assets can be constrained
by the government in a non discriminatory fashion; namely the constraint must
be the same for every individual. Hence, we add the following constraints to
the private sector optimization problems:
bq ,bq (25)
where q 0 is the limit to foreign assets holding allowed by the
government. Whenever these constraints are binding, the first order
conditions of the capitalists can be obtained by solving problem (18) with the
additional constraint (25). These conditions are:
—v'(x1) +(1—P)v'(q)+
Pv'(f'(k2)+-k2÷q—d2)
—nc=0 (26)
—(1—P)v'(q) +c+Pv'(f'(k2)+k2+q—d2)[s(1+f'(k2)—1] =0 (27)
where n is the (non—negative) Lagrange multiplier associated with (25). The
first order condition for the workers (obtained by solving problem (16) with
the additional constraint (25)) is:
16-u'(c1) + Pu'(q)+(1-P)u'(k2+f(k2)+q-d2) - = 0 (28)
where n is the (non—negative) Lagrange multiplier associated with (25).
In Appendix 4 it is shown that the type 'c" government chooses d2 =d.
Moreover, this government is always worse off with capital controls, since the
controls impose an additional binding constraint on the capitalists optimum
problem. The workers are forced to redistribute differently their COnsuoption
over time, but this does not affect the capitalists' welfare in any sense.
Hence, the type 'c" government would never choose to impose capital controls.
Capital controls have instead both costs and benefits for the government
"w". The costs are due to the additional constraint on the workers problem.
With capital controls, the workers cannot freely increase their savings to
offset the government dissavings. On the other hand, capital controls have
the effect of forcing the capitalists to invest more domestically. By
applying the implicit function theorem to (26) and (27), it can be shown that
ak2< 0. Thus, by restricting the access to foreign capital markets, the
'w" government obtains the benefit of a larger domestic capital formation, and
a larger tax base in period 2.
These considerations provide the basic intuition for the following
result, which is formally proved in section 4 of the Appendix:
Proposition 4
If in the absence of capital controls b > b ,then the 'w" government
always imposes capital controls that are binding on both the workers and the
capitalists. The "c' government never imposes capital controls.
The level of the controls imposed by the "w" government is a fraction of
the workers' degree of risk aversion.If the u(.) function is very concave,
then the workers find It very costly to restrict their means of intertemporal
consumption smoothing in exchange for a higher domestic capital stock. In
this case even a type "w" would tolerate a substantial amount of capital
flight. Conversely, the smaller is the workers' degree of risk aversion, the
tighter are the controls imposed by the "WI' type (i.e.: the smaller is q). In
the extreme case of risk neutrality, the workers' government would always
choose q =0,thereby completely prohibiting capital outflows.Needless to
17say, this would also happen in the case in which the workers had no access to
the international capital markets (i.e., b =0).
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This finding, namely that left wing governments are more inclined to
impose capital controls than right wing governments, is probably consistent
with the empirical evidence as suggested by Table 5.As explained at the
bottom of this Table, a higher value of the index of capital restriction
implies more capital conLrols.In Argentina, Chile and Peru the pattern is
consistent with the model. A movement towards the right has coincided with a
relative relaxation of capital controls.In Mexico and Venezuela there is
less volatility in the political orientation of the government, thus it is
harder to identify sharp political changes.The policy of capital controls
has also been relatively stable in these countries; for example, Mexico and
Venezuela have consistently adopted a policy with relatively few restrictions.
In Brazil and the Philippines, center left democratic governments have
recently been established following a long period of right—wing dictatorships.
It is still early to identify the directions which these two governments will
take in terms of capital controls.
5. Debt Repudiation
Let us assume now that the government has the option of repudiating the
debt in the final period.If the government chooses to repudiate, it suffers
a loss, which takes two forms. First of all, the country loses a fraction of
its national output, as in Sachs (1985) Cohen—Sachs (1985).13 This loss of
income can be justified as the result of retaliation against the defaulting
country, such as trade restriction, seizure of public goods (planes, ships,
etc.) or the withdrawal of foreign private Investments-— (cf. Aizenman
(1987)). Throughout the paper we allow the fraction of income that is lost in
the event of a debt repudiation to depend on which government Is in office at
the time of the repudiation. Specifically, we denote with e1 the fraction of
output lost if the i government repudiates, i=c,w, and we assume that
l>ec￿ew>O This weak inequality is meant to capture the fact that presumably
economic and financial exchanges with the rest of the world are more important
for the welfare of right wing governments and their constituencies than for
socialist governments. Right wing governments may be more likely to rely on
foreign investments and foreign trade for the success of their policies than
18TABLE 5
Political Regimes and Capital Controls
(1967 —1986)
Level of
Political Capital
Country Time Period Regime Restrictions
Argentina 1967—72 right—wing 0.67
1973—75 Peronist 2
1976—83 military dictatorship 1.25
1984-86 center-left 1
BrazIl 1967-78 right-wing 1.67
1979—84 center—right 2
1985/86 center—left 2
Chile 1967—70 center-left 2
1970—73 radical—left 2
1974—86 military dictatorship 1.54
Mexico 1967-86 center—left 0.34
Peru 1967/68 center—right 0.5
1969—76 "left" military 1.75
1977—79 "right" military 1.67
1980—84 transition to democracy 1
1985/86 center—left 2
Philippines 1967—72 right—wing democratic 0. 5
1973—85 right—wing dictatorship 1
1986 center—left democratic 1Tabl& 5 Continued
Level of
Political Capital
Country Time Period Regime Restrictions
Venezuela 1967-69 center—left 0
1969—73 center—right 0.2
1974—78 center—left 0.6
1979—83 center—right 0.8
1984—86 center—left 1.67
Uruguay 1967—72 center-left 0.83
1973—76 "right" military 2
1977—81 "center" military 1.2
1982-84 transition to democracy 0
1985/86 center-left 0
Sources: Arthur Banks (edj, Political Handbook of the World, Binghamton NY 1986. l,Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Washington D.C.,
967—1986
Construction of table:
Each IMF report 967—1967 contains a sunwnary table of exchange arrangements and exchange
restrictions in all countries of the world. For each year, the countries in this table are
assigned 0, 1 or 2 points, depending on whether they have no capital restrictions,1O points),
either "separate exchange rates for some or all capital transactions" or "restrictions on
payments for capital transactions" (1 point), or both 12 points). To calculate the
restrictiveness of a political regime with respect to capital transactions, these points are
suamied over and divided by the number of years the regime is in power. Thus, a higher value nay
be interpreted as characterizing a more restrictive regime.If a regime ends early in a year,
this year is counted for the fol lowisg regime. When uncertain about the attribution of a
transition year to two regimes, this year is assigned -1-0 both regimes with weights 1/2, 1/2.left wing governments are. As such, the economic costs of the trade
disruption that would follow a repudiation are not larger for the w than for
the c type.14 In any case, the qualitative features of the results on
repudiation hold also in the case e =e.
Secondly, if the country repudiates its external debt, a fraction 1>>O
of its external assets are seized by foreign creditors. All the parameters of
the model including and 81 are perfectly known to both governments and to
the risk neutral lenders.
With a convenient change in notation relative to the previous sections,
suppose that if an amount 12 is borrowed today by the government, the amount
due for repayment next period is R(d2)d2, R(d2) being the gross real interest
rate. Thus, we allow R to depend on the amount borrowed, d2. The value of d2
that leaves the government of type i just indifferent between repudiating or
repaying the debt is defined by:
[e'f(k2) +b] i =w,c. (29)
R(d)
If d2 >d1,then the gain of repudiation exceeds its c0st, and the government
of type i prefers to repudiate. Conversely, if d2 <dtype i prefers to repay
the debt.
This formulation of the problem highlights the fact that the costs of
debt repudiation are different for the two government types, if either
or b b .Thisfeature of the model goes well beyond the
specific example considered in this paper; it captures the general idea that
the cost of repudiation are not uniformly distributed, thus different groups
have different preferences regarding this issue.15
Let us assume for realism and simplicity that for all parameter values:
b >b (30)
which simply implies that the non taxable endowment of the capitalists, ec,
is sufficiently larger than the non taxable endowment of the workers, eW.
Under this realistic hypothesis, it is easy to show that in equilibrium
the type 'c' government never repudiates. In fact, letting d denote the
maximum amount lent by financial markets, in equilibrium we obtain
20(31)
This result can be easily proven by contradiction.16 --c -w
We are left with two cases: a) In the first one, d =d>d Here, the
'c" type never repudiates; but the "w" type repudiates if in equilibrium d2 >
-w -w -w -c
d .Hence, d carries the risk free interest rate: R(d )= lie.Whereas d
-c
carries a risk premium: R(d )= 1/eP.Using (29), this case applies if the
following condition holds:
P[ef(k2) +b1
>ewf(k2)
+ (32)
b) The second case implies d = andoccurs if (32) is violated.Here in
equilibrium neither type repudiates the debt: the government borrows at the
risk free rate up to dW and cannot borrow at all beyond this point.
The value of P discriminates between the two cases:If P is high (32)
holds, if P is low it does not. In particular there exists a value of P, say
P, for which if P>P case (a) occurs.17
In case (b), in which d =d,theanalysis of the previous sections
applies almost identically.Since both governments repay the debt, there is
no repudiation risk. Hence, the private sector first order conditions and the
optimization problem faced by both government types are identical to those of
the previous sections, except in one respect. Namely, here both types take
into account that, by increasing k2 and b, they can partially relax their
borrowing constraint (since they can shift d ).Under a very plausible
condition, this aspect does not make any difference.18 As in the previous
sections, both types always borrow as much as they can, setting d2 =d; see
Section 5 of the Appendix for the proof.19
--c-w
Case (a), where d =d>d,ismore interesting. Now the private sector
and both governments must take into account the possibility of debt
repudiation. Moreover because of the risk premium, the interest rate faced by
the government varies with the size of its external debt: it is R =liein
-w -w
the interval [O,d I; it jumps to R =lisPif d2 >d
We know from the discussion of case (b) and of the previous sections that
neither government type would ever set d2 < (seealso section 5 of the
-w
Appendix).If d2 >d,thenthe government debt will be repudiated with
probability (1—P). Hence the private sector first order conditions
21-w
for d2 >dare no longer given by (17), and (19). Instead, for the workers
they are:
-u'(c1) +Pu(b)
+(1-P)(1-)u'(w2÷g
+b(1-))
=0 (33)
and for the capitalists they are:
-v'(x1) +(1—P)(1—)v'(b(1-))
+Pv'(b
+
k2÷f(k2)—w2 +g)
0 (34)
—(1—P)(1—)v'(b(1—)) +Pv(b+k2+f(k2)—w2+g)(8(1+f'(k2))—1)=O (35)
Consider the optimization problem faced by the type 'w" government in the
interval d2 >', subjectto these new constraints. Section 5 of the
Appendix shows that the solution to this problem yields d2 =d.Thus, the
-w -
governmentof type "w' sets either d2 =dor d2 =d.The same result holds
for the uchgovernment(see Appendix). Thus the two governments choose either
d or d, depending on which one delivers a higher utility for their
constituency. In general this comparison is ambiguous.
If in period 1 the government chooses d, then the debt is repudiated if
the "w" government is in office in period 2. The following proposition
establishes the conditions under which repudiation is observed.
Proposition 5
(i) If d2 =dW,then no debt repudiation occurs in equilibrium. (ii) If -w —
d2>d ,thedebt is repudiated if and only if type "w' is in office in period
2. If w is in office in period 1, then sufficient conditions for case (ii) to
occur are (32) and k2(d) ￿k2(dW).If c is in office in period 1, then case
(ii) can occur if, in addition to these two conditions, 8c>8w and is small.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result has several interesting implications. First of all, it shows
that the option of repudiating the debt does not eliminate the government
incentive to overaccumulate external debt. Secondly, it shows that debt
repudiation can occur in equilibrium, if the left wing government unexpectedly
holds office in the final period (that is, if P is high enough). This element
22-w
of surprise is needed to induce financial markets to lend beyond the point d
6. Conclusions
This paper links the political instability of developing countries to
their accumulation of public external debt, private capital outflow, income
distribution, restrictions on capital outflows and repudiation of external
debt. All these issues are considered in a simple dynamic model in which the
crucialelement isthe existence of two socialgroups behaving
noncooperatively.In particular, each group attempts to redistribute income
by means of fiscal policy when it holds office. The uncertainty about which
group will be in control in the future generates the political risk" which in
turn influences the current economic decisions of private agents and of the
government.Thus, this model formalizes the economic effects of political
risk, and, for instance, it is consistent with the observation that capital
flight are more likely to occur in politically turbulent periods.
We have chosen to present the simplest possible version of the models, to
enhance readibility.However, the qualitative results of the analysis are
robust to generalizations of the model in several directions. For instance,
the basic results generalize to an infinte horizon model (at least for some
functional forms of the utility functions); to a model with an endogenous
labor supply; to a model in which the workers are prevented to hold external
assets; to a model in which the government provides also public goods; with
certain caveats (described in more detail in Alesina—Tabellini (1987)) to a
model in which the preferences of the two governments are less extreme; to a
model in which the probability of the change of government is endogenously
derived by the underlying preferences of rational voters (see, again, Alesina
—Tabellini(1987) and Alesina (1988a)); to a model In which there exist upper
bounds on tax rates so that the governments cannot completely expropriate
their adversaries.
Several additional issues for a politico—economic explanation of the
external debt of developing countries which deserve attention have not been
considered. For instance, we have focused only on one kind of social
conflict, between owners of physical capital and owners of human capital. An
additional important social conflict is the one between the tradeable versus
nontradeable goods sectors, which In several circumstances may imply a
23conflict between industry and agriculture or certain industrial sectors and
others. Workers and capitalists in, say, the tradeable sector may have
economic interests in conflict with those of workers and capitalists in the
nontradeable sector.For example, the two groups may disagree about the
desirability of exchange rate devaluation, trade restrictions and repudiation
of external debt.
Second, we have not explicitly included monetary variables in our model,
thus we have not addressed important issues such as inflation and devaluation.
Rapid changesin the price level can have important redistributive
consequences which affect and are affected by political factors. In
particular, these monetary phenomena may contribute in an important way to
explain capital flight (Dornbusch (1985), Cuddington (1985)).
Third, politico economic considerations crucially affect the choice
between "repudiation and "solvency with adjustment". In general different
social groups gain and lose depending upon which policy option is adopted.
24Footnotes
1. Sachs (1984) describes this phenomen as "a special sort of intermediation:
the private sectors of Latin America made offshore dollar loans to the
Latin American public sectors.With specific reference to Argentina,
Dornbusch and de Pablo (1987) write that "comercial banks in New York,
Zurich and Tokyo had lent to the government the resources to finance
capital flight which returned to the same banks as deposits."
2. For a detailed discussion of alternative measures of capital flight, see
Cumby—Levich (1987).They show that different definitions of capita'
flight and different data sources imply some significant differences in
the estimates. However, there is no doubt about the order of magnitude of
capital flights: in several countries and severa time periods they have
been a substantial fraction of external borrowing.
3. See, for instance, Dornbusch—Fischer (1986).
4. Political polarization and instability in Latin America is a fairly self
evident and well documented fact. Mallon and Sourroville (1975) as quoted
by Oornbusch and de Pablo (1987) capture this point and write that
"Decision Makers in Argentina have quite consistently attempted to adopt
policy positions that seemed designed to tear society apart rather than to
forge new coalitions." Dornbusch and de Pablo (1987) emphasize that this
political polarization "has meant that much of national wealth is held
abroad and taxes are paid by only a few."
5. See, for instance, Kaufman (1986), Haggard (1986) and the references
quoted therein.In addition to the political conflict amongst different
factor of production, that is the focus of this paper, many of the
countries under examination also have a conflict across sectors of the
economy (such as agricultural, industrial and comercial). See for
instance Sachs (1985) and Frieden (1987). Incorporating this richer
political dimension in the analysis of this paper Is a difficult task,
which is left for future research.
6. Related findings are obtained by Alesina—Tabellini (1987) Tabellini-
Alesina (1988) and Persson—Svensson (1987) for domestic government debt,
in a closed and open economy respectively.
7. This is a highly simplified treatment of repudiation risk, since repudi-
ation costs are given exogenously and not endogenously derived from
25lender's behavior. For a severe criticism of these models see Gersovitz
(1985); for a different treatment of external debt repudiation see
Grossman—Van Huyck (1986), Bulow—Rogoff (1987) and (1988).
8. The result that left wing governments are more likely to repudiate the
debt is also consistent with the view that the burden of debt repayment
falls disproportionately on labor income (as opposed to capital income),
as emphasized by Dornbusch (1986). It is also consistent with the obser-
vation that the Soviet Union, China and Cuba repudiated their external
debts after their revolutions. Alesina (1988b) discusses related issues
for the case of the internal debts of several European countries in the
interwar period.
9. "Workers" are prevented from acquiring domestic capital in order to empha-
size the difference between the two groups. Alternatively one might
capture a difference between "rich" and "poor" due to different endowment
rather than by their productive role. This alternative specification has
not been explored yet.
10. An alternative specification which leads to qualitatively analogous result
would be to have transfers proportional to wages and capital rather than
w C
lump sum. This would imply to let 0, z 0 and set g1 =0and
=0.
11. In particular, the qualitative results of the model survive the imposition
of either of these two additional constraints on workers' behavior: a)
b =0; b) b ￿ 0 .Case(a) implies that the workers have no access
to international financial markets. Under this assumption all the resu'ts
of this model are strengthened. (The proof is available from the
authors). Case (b), which implies that workers cannot borrow abroad, can
be easily accounted for.In fact, we show below that in equilibrium we
obtain b >0.Thus, the constraint given in (b) is never binding.
12. These results about capital controls should be slightly qualified if the
labor supply were elastic. In this case the imposition of capital
controls on the workers would in general affect both their intertemporal
allocation of consumption and leisure. By working through the proof of
Proposition 4 it is easy to verify that the result about the workers'
government does not change. For the 'c' government the elast'city of
leisure with respect to capital controls may reinforce or weaken the
aversion to capital controls depending on the utility function of workers
26(i.e. if capital controls make them work more or less).
13. As in Sachs (1985) and Cohen—Sachs (1985) we assume that the severity of
the "punishment, i.e. he fraction of output lost in case of repudiation,
is independent of the amount of repudiation. This feature of the model
eliminates partial repudiation as a rational choice. For a more general
version of a related model of repudiation in which the extent of the
punishment is a function of the amount of debt repudiated see Calvo
(1987).
14. The case >ecis less plausible and, in addition, it has the same
similar qualitative implications of the case considered in the text as
long as b is sufficiently bigger than b
15. In general there are other reasons, besides those considered in the paper,
for arguing that the costs of debt repudiation affect differently
different groups of the population.For instance, the traded goods and
financial sectors are more likely to be harmed than the non—traded goods
sectors. Diaz—Alejandro (1984) contains some discussion of these issues.
16. Suppose that (31) were violated: then it must be that￿d> Thus,
-c -c -w
d carries the risk free interest rate, R(d )= lie,whereas d carries a
risk premium.If type "c' is in office in period 2 (which happens with
-w
probability P) and d2 =d,thenthe debt will be repudiated. Hence,
-c -w
R (d )= 1/[s(1-P)]>R(d).Insertingthese expressions for R(d )and
-c
R(d )in(29) and using (30) yields a contradiction.
17. Define *suchas the value for which (32) holds as an equality; namely *
satisfies
ewf(u (P*)) + (P*) 2 2
Ocf(U(P*)) +eb(P*)
It can be easily shown that 1>P*>0. However P* may not be unique. Define
P as the highest value of *andP as the lowest. Then case (a) occurs
for P> P and case (b) for P<P. For P>P>P either case can occur depending
on parameter values.
3k
18. The condition is that ef'(k2) —< 1.Ifthis conditions is relaxed, it
would no longer be true that the1 type 'w sets g =0.The results con-
cerning government debt are independent of whether or not this conditions
holds.
2719. Note that here, unlike in Section 3, the size of the debt constraint
depends on which government is in office in the first period (via the
terms k2 and by).
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31APPENDIX
1. Derivation of Equation (22)
The type c government optimization problem in period 1 can be written as
follows: maximize (20) subject to (13) in the text and to the following first
order conditions of the private sector derived in the text as equations (17),
(19a) and (19b) respectively.
F(b,k2,d2)a -u (eWeb) + Pu(b) + (1-P)u(k2+f(k2) + b-d2) =0 (A.L)
H(b,k2,d2) a -v'(f(k)+ k1 + ec - - k2+ ad2) +
(1—P)v(b) + Pv(b4-k2+f(k2) —d2)=0 (A.2)
—(1—P)v(b)+ Pv(b+-k2+f(k2)—d2).[a(1+f(k2)) —1]=0 (A.3)
The government budget constraint has been substituted in (A.1) -(A.3).The
government maximizes with respect to k2, b, b, d2. Let , andi denote the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3)
respectively.Moreover, let F1, G1 and H1 denote the derivatives of F, G and H
with respect to the variable i.Then, the first order conditions of this
optimization problem can be written, after rearrangements as:
XHc+iGc=O (A.4)
b2 b2
(A.5)
b2
xHk + Gk + F w =0 (A.6)
2 2
b2
av' (f(k1)+k1÷ec_$b_k2+Bd2) —
-Pv(f(k2)+ k2+ b -d2)+ xHd + + Fd -y = 0 (A.7)
Aly(d -d)=o (A.8)
Since F 0, (A.5) implies =0.Since H ,G , , 0,(A.4) and
b b 2
2
(A.6) imply .== 0.As a result, (A.7) implies equation (22) in the text.
2. Proof of Proposition 2
By following the same steps as in Section 1 of this Appendix, the problem of
the type w government in period 1 can be written as:
d bwk bchl2?22222
(A.9)
2' 2' 2' 2
Subject to (13) in the text and to:
F(b,k2,d2) _u(k1+ew+f(k1)+Bd2_Bb)+PU(b)+(1_P)u(k2+f(k2Hb_d2)0
(A.10)
H(b,k2,d2)
(A.11)
and to (A.3).Note that the functions F(.) and H(.) are identical to F(-) and
H(.) in Section 1 of the appendix in all respects except for the terms referring
to c1 and x1.This is because c1 and x1 are different depending upon which
government is in office in period 1.Denoting by ,xand the Lagrange
multipliers associated with (A.1O), (A.11) and (A.3) respectively, we can write
the first order conditions of this problem as:
=o (A.12)
b
cc0
(A.13)
b2 b2
a(1—P)u(k2+f(k2)+b) + + + Fk=0 (A.14)
2 2 2
A28u (k1÷f(k1+eW+ad2_b) —(1—P)u(k2÷f(k2)+b—d2)
+ 4- Gd+-= o (A.15)
2 2 2
= (A.16)
Since F*0,(A.12) implies=0.By computing the partial derivatives
b2
of H(.), G(.) and R(.) and rearranging, we obtain:
=Pu(b)
+(1—P)u(k2+f(k2)+b—d2)(1+f(k2flA
(A.17)
G Hd —HG
b 2bd2 where A
GkH _HkG 2b 2b
Some tedious algebra establishes that A >0Hence, (A.16), (A.17) imply that d2 =
d.The rest of the proof of Porposition 2 is contained in Section 2 of the text.
3. Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the system of equations given by the capitalists first order
conditions when the government of type c is in office, equations (A.2) and
(A.3). Applying the implicit function theorem at the point d2 =we obtain
——
GkGc
-1
Gd2
—
HkH0
IH_GcEGd T
2 b2 21
I I
I _Hk Gk 22 L2
A3where = H —GHk .Bythe second order sufficient conditions for the
2 b2 b2
privatesector optimization problem, >0.We thus have:
=—[HG
—
GCHdJ (A.19)
2 2
bC
=- [-H 0dGkHdJ (A.20)
Computing the expression for the partial derivatives of H(.) and G(.) from (A.2)
and (A.3), it can be shown that the right hand sides of (A.19) and (A.20) are both
positive.By repeating the same procedure, from (A.2) and (A.3) we also obtain
that:
ak2 1 —- - [HG -GHJ >0
b2 b2
C
au2 1 =—[-H G +GkHJ <0
2 2
Consider now the workers first order condition when the government in period
1 is of type "c, equation (A.1).By the implicit function theorem at the point
=dwe obtain:
ab Fd
2 w
2
ab F
This comp1etethe proof of Proposition 3 for the case in which the type 'c'
government is in office in the first period. In order to prove Proposition 3 for
the case in which the type "wis in office in period 1, simply repeat these
A4procedures, replacing equations (A.1) and (A.2) by equations (A.1O) and (A.11)
respectively.
4. Proof of Porposition 4
The proof of the statement concerning the 'c' government is immediate. Here
we prove the statement concerning the "w" government. Suppose that the capital
controls are binding for both groups, i.e., q =b
=
bw2and c, w >
Theproblem of the "w" type can be written as follows:
Max u(y1+k1+e1—aq+sd2) +s[Pu(q)+(1—P)u(k2+f(k2)+q—d2)J (A.21)
subject to (26), (27), (28) and (13). -
Letus indicate with H, 8 and R the constraints (26), (27), and (28)
respectively, and let , andEbethe multipliers associated with these
constraints. is the Lagrange multiplier of (13).
The first order conditions of this problem imply:
=sPu'(q)+a(1-P)[(1÷f'(k2)]u'(k2+f(k2)+q-d2)8
-w (A.22)
Hd +
d2
where 8- > 0.
R
k2 k2
(A.22) is the analogue of (A.17) for this modified problem. Note that since
>0because the capital controls are binding, is not necessarily positive.
Thus, if the capital controls are binding d2 is not necessarily equal to d.
Let z(q) be the indirect utility function associated to this problem. By the
envelope theorem it follows that
1A23 qq
where L is the Lagrangian associated to problem (A.21). After rearrangements it
follows that:
=8w+s[vh1(eck2q) + Pv"(f(k2)+k2+q-d2)(1+f'(k2))I (A.24)
A5The first term on the right hand side of (A.24) is positive, the second is
negative (since >0).Consider equation (A.24) at the point in which q is just
binding for the workers and strictly binding for the capitalists. Thus, if q* is
this point it follows that q* =b
<b,where b and b are the external assets
that would be chosen without capital controls. (A.24) implies that
0for b >q>q* (A.25)
(A.25) follows from the fact that =0for q ￿q*while the second term remains
negative forq <b(I.e., if the capital controls are binding for the
capitalist).If q b capital controls are not binding for anyone so they do
not affect anybody's welfare.Since the function z(q)is continuous, it follows
that it has a maximum for q <q*,that is for a value of q such that the controls
are binding on both the capitalists and the workers.
More generally, it follows from (28) in the text that, for a given q, c is
smaller the smaller is the concavity of u(.). Hence, the optimal value of q for
the 'w" type (i.e., the value of q such that the right hand side of (A.24) is
zero) tends in general to be smaller the less concave is u(.). That is, as
claimed in the text, the controls Imposed by the 'w' type are stricter the smaller
is the concavity of u. In the limit, if workers are risk neutral, then (28)
implies that w =0.According to (A.24), If then follows that argmax z(q) =0.
5. Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the governments optimization problem for case (b), in which
=". Theproblem is identical to those of sectthns 1 and 2 of the appendix,
except that now =[ef(k2)+,b1
a. Hence the government first order conditions
with respect to k2 and b now take into account the effect of k2 and b on d.
Moreover, since government debt here Is treated as a loan rather than as a
discount bond, the government now chooses 2 Rd2 = d. With these changes,
the first order conditions of type 'c' are given by (A.6), (A.7) (with d2 replaced
by D2 in them), by (A.8) and by:
+ 0 (A.5)'
b2
xHk + ++ eCf(k)=0 (A.6)'
2 2 2
A6To prove that the solution is at d2 =, proceedby contradiction.Suppose
thatd2 <. Theny= 0by (A.8) and =0by (A.5). But then (A.4) and
(A.6) imply x == 0,so that (A.7)implies >0 (cf.(22)),a
contradiction.Hence the first order conditions must be satisfied at d2 =d.
Repeating exactly the same procedure for the type w' government yields that this
type sets d2
dw. This completes the proof for case (b) of the text, where
=. Moreover,it also proves that, in case (a), where d = >
neithertype would ever set d2 <. Nowconsider case (a) in the interval
￿ d >', andproceed as in sections 2 and 1 of the Appendix. Suppose that
type w is in office in period 1. His expected utility function over this range
is:
—
eb+aPD2)+ePu(b)++s(1—P)u(k2+f(k2) (l_eW)+b(1_)) (A.26)
where we used the condition =
d2/8P
.Theconstraints are given by (33) —
(35)that are rewritten here as:
F(b, k2, D2) =— u'(k1÷e'+f(k1)+
8PO2—Bb)
+
+ Pu(b)+(1_P)(1_$)U1(k2+f(k2)(1_8w) +b(1-))
=0 (A.27)
H(b, k2,02)
—v(ec_ab_k2)
+
+ (1—P)(1.-) v'(b(1—p) + Pv'(b-+-k2+f(k2)—O2)
=0 (A.28)
G(b, k2, -(1-P)(1-) v(b(1-)) +
+ Pv(b4-k2-+-f(k2)—02)IB(1+f(k2))
—1] =0 (A.29)
and by the borrowing constraint:
A7[8Wf(k) + ￿ 02 (A.30)
Adopting the same notational conventions of sections 1 and 2 of the Appendix, we
can write the first order conditions of this optimization problem as:
F=0 (A.12)
b
(A.13)
b2 b2
a(1-P) u(k2+f(k2) +b)(1+f(k2)) +k2
+k2
+k2
+
+ ;ewf(k2)=0 (A.14)
BPU(k1+f(k1) +ew+
8PD2—sb)
+ + + —= 0 (A.15)
2 2 2
y[ef(k2) +
—
02]
=0 (A.16)
From (A.12), =0. Now proceed by contradiction.Suppose that y=0.
Inserting (A.13) and (A.14)' in (A.15) we obtain:
Pu'(c1) +(1—P)u(c2)(1+f(k2))A= 0 (A.31)
where -- -
A =
H
::2
b:
2 b2 b
Sometediousalgebra establishes that A >0.Hence we obtain a contradiction, and
y> 0. By (A.16)It then follows that 02 = or that d2 == d.
Repeating exactly the same procedure for the type c government, we obtain that
in the Interval d2 >?, type calso goes to the corner, by
setting d2
ac.Thus, both types either set d2 = ord2 =d.
A8In order to see whether or d yields a higher expected utility for the
two types, we need to compare the value of the capital shock at d, k2(d), and at
',k(').
In general, this comparison is ambiguous. The external assets of
the capitalist have a lower expected return at the point than at ,sincea
fraction of them would be seized in the event of a debt repudiation. However,
the marginal utility of income for the capitalists is higher in that case.In
other words, the income and substitution effects go in opposite direction, and b
can be either higher or lower at athanat Onthe other hand, it can be
shown that the capitalists always have more at d than at (because of a
"Ricardian equivalence argument in the event that type 'c' holds office next
period). For this reason, the case in whichk21) ￿k2(a')
seems more
plausible.In this case, the type "w" government always goes at d rather than
at .Considerfor simplicity the casek2() =k2().
If the "w' type
borrows up to ,itcan effect a larger transfer to its constituency than if it
borrowed up to '.Supposethat this extra amount of transfers (d - is
spent by the workers in period 1: their utility in period 1 is higher. Moreover,
their expected utility in the second period is the same as if the government had
borrowed only up to (since, by definition of ',typew is just indifferent
between repudiating the debt or repayingi").Ifthe workers spread the extra
transfers optimally across time, their overall utility is even higher.Thus, if
k2() =k2()
type 'w' is better off at than at .Afortiori, this is
also true if k2() >k2(). Summarizing, if k2() ?k2('),
then type 'w'
always sets d2 =
Considernow type 'c. Suppose, for simplicity, that =0 but
>9Itis easy to show that if P is sufficiently high, then d2 =d.
Intuitively, if =0,the cost of debt repudiation is only born by the
government who repudiates. As a consequence, the results of the previous section
apply: type c does not fully internalize the costs of issuing government debt,
since if it is not reappointed debt repayment or debt repudiation is not costly
for him. Moreover, if P is sufficiently close to 1, the interest cost due to the
risk premium is negligible.As a result, type 'c' is better off at d than
'. Bycontinuity, this argument also applies if >0but small. Conversely,
suppose that 8c=8w and is large.Here, it can be shown that d2 = may
be optimal for type c. At d2 =, theinterest rate on external debt is higher
because of the risk premium. Moreover, the type "c' government suffers a loss if
the the debt is repudiated, since some of the capitalists external assets are
A9seized.It can be shown that, if k2(3)k2(') this loss always exceeds in
real terms the additional resources appropriated through the extra borrowing.
Hence, if
k2(d)k2(?), type "calways prefers 'relativeto .If
> k2()then the comparison is ambiguous.However, under the hypothesis
that 8C = and is large, the solutiond2 =awis more likely.
AlO